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Introduction
The first decade of the twenty-first century, particularly since 9/11, has been marked
by popular demands for more and more restrictive immigration policies across the
globe. Recent events such as the deportation of undocumented migrants in France,
the new 2010 Arizona immigration law, as well as swelling popular support for
draconian immigration policies proposed by diverse political constituencies such
as the Tea Partiers in the U.S. are all emblematic of this conservative turn. While
multiple concerns may be fueling the rising ambivalence toward immigration, one
important source of anxiety across these different contexts is the percep tion that mi -
grants pose a financial burden to the state. Concerns about the type, extent, and
timing of state-provided social services for immigrants —if any— re flect deep ide-
ological divides in many countries. On the one hand, opponents of welfare programs
that include immigrants as beneficiaries claim that these programs not only attract
immigrants (the “magnet hypothesis”), but also create a “culture of dependency” and
are an unsustainable strain on the state (Bauer and Zimmerman 2002; Borjas 2002;
Brucker et al. 2001). In contrast, others recognize the importance migrants have
on host societies’ economies and the future sustainability of the welfare system (Cor -
nelius, Tsuda, Martin, et al. 2004; Facchini and Mayda 2007). This variation among
institutional environments calls for the investigation of the relationship between the
welfare state and practices associated with entitle ment, exclusion, and overall polit-
ical and social membership (Geddes 2003, 152).
In this article, I engage with the scholarly debates concerning the problem-
atic relationship between the state and democratic institutions, as well as inter-
national migration through the lens of welfare state regimes (see Bloemraad 2006;
Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008; Bommes and Morawska 2005; Brettell
and Hollifield 2000; Castles 2007; Castles and Miller 2003; Cornelius et al. 2004;
Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005; Freeman 2007; Geddes 2003; Givens 2007;
Hollifield 2000 and 2007; Messina 2002 and 2007; Messina and Lahav 2005). In
particular, I examine whether individuals’ perceptions of the sustainability and
viability of the welfare state system can be predicted by the impact immigrants
are perceived to have on the economy and welfare system: what has been com-
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monly referred to as “welfare chauvinism” (Freeman 2009). Welfare chauvinism is
defined as resentment of immigrants who are perceived to take natives’ jobs, cause
unemployment, and are overall seen to benefit from more than contribute toward
the welfare state system (Crepaz and Damron 2009). If indeed there is a relationship,
this raises the question of whether the welfare state can intervene and reduce pro -
tectionism, anti-immigrant sentiment, and overall levels of prejudice. Do exten-
sive, universal versus targeted means-tested welfare provisions schemes have the
capacity to reduce protectionism? The investigation of whether countries with
highly developed corporatist welfare state programs (such as Sweden and the Nether -
lands) are more, less, or just as likely to express protectionism than countries with
more restricted welfare policies, where an ethos of individual res ponsibility pre-
vails (such as Britain), can shed light on the relationship between immigration and
the future of the European social policy model. Central to my analysis is the ex plo -
ration of whether rich institutional environments (e.g., the policies, programs, and
legislation enacted by the welfare state) are key contextual predictors in assessing
the relationship between different forms of threats to and perceptions of the wel-
fare state. If so, institutional and political environments set the stage for specific
inter-group relationships to take place, and, as such, variabi lity across institutional
environments will necessarily produce differences in public opinion about immigra -
tion. At the same time, within countries, it is not clear whether groups who benefit
differently from welfare state programs (such as the unemployed, the disabled, the
elderly, etc.) are more or less likely to express approval of protectionism. Thus, build-
ing upon the work of Freeman (2009) and Crepaz and Damron (2009), the analysis
herein provides empirical evidence for whether countries with more advanced and
universal social protection systems not only avoid stigma tiza tion and social cate-
gorization, but are also more likely to foster social cohesiveness and actually help
socially integrate immigrants into host societies. The findings are particularly rel-
evant in light of a recent study by Koopmans that suggests a very different picture:
one in which labor market participation of migrants is lower in countries with more
robust welfare state systems. In the Netherlands and Sweden, countries that have
embraced multicultural integration policies, migrants’ participation in the labor mar-
ket is lower compared to Austria, Germany and Switzer land which traditionally “chose
to retain high barriers to migrants becoming full citizens and made residency right
dependent on performance in the labor market and the absence of a criminal record”
(2010, 20). Koopmans further shows that in countries with a limited welfare state
such as the UK, immigrants are better off in terms of labor participation (2010, 21).
This article approaches these questions from two angles. First, the relation-
ship between people’s perceptions of the welfare state and threats to it is assessed at
the individual level. Thus, classic individual-level theories and controls are evalu-
ated as they are tied to different forms of prejudice and protectionism (Quillian
1995). For example, I examine whether individuals’ socioeconomic characteristics
shape their perceptions of the welfare state. What are the public responses to the
coverage, sustainability, and future of the social protection system as host societies
become more multiethnic? 
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Secondly, institutional factors are tested vis-à-vis other contextual effects
(such as a country’s economic conditions) that may be associated with processes
regarding the development of welfare state policies and their relationship to per-
ceptions of immigrants. Welfare states are defined as “powerful institutional forces
embodying ideas and practices associated with inclusion, exclusion, membership,
belonging, entitlement, and identity” (Geddes 2003, 152). The approach used
assumes that individuals’ public perceptions are expected to vary across countries
depending on institutional characteristics, more specifically the type of welfare state
regimes each country has. Esping-Andersen (1990) argues that institutional struc -
tures have historically resulted from class- and ethnic-based social movements
leading to forms of collective action and solidarity whose outcome is specific insti -
tutio nal welfare regimes. Institutional arrangements that arise from these class-based
social movements will lead to solidarity (and social capital) and ultimately affect
the ways migrants become incorporated into the host society. 
By introducing the institutional dimension, the relationship between percep-
tions of economic and political threats posed by immigrants and perceptions of the
welfare state can be better captured as a result of the existence or lack of a robust wel-
fare state system. From this perspective, types of welfare regimes (and the poli cies
aimed at regulating social inequalities) may intervene in shaping public attitudes
toward immigration. Thus, expenditure levels for social protection systems will help
explain the interaction between perceptions of welfare state policies and the emer -
gence of new forms of immigrant threat. Overall, the question guiding this analy-
sis focuses on whether a relationship between micro-level predictors of protec-
tionism and perceptions of the future of the welfare state are mediated or not by the
development of welfare state policies. 
Immigration and Welfare State Regimes
There is growing literature in the United States and Europe that examines the use
of welfare benefits by migrants (see, for example, Bauer and Zimmerman 2002;
Bean and Van Hook 1998; Borjas 2002; Freeman 2009). In this literature, one of
the key tenets is that as host societies become more ethnically heterogeneous, both
levels of support for welfare programs (Freeman 2009) and levels of generalized
social trust/social capital decrease (Putnam 2007). Since liberal demo cracies have
the responsibility to provide social rights and benefits to their populations, includ-
ing immigrants (Soysal 1994), the available institutional framework shapes the
relationship between immigration and trust in institutions (Crepaz 2008; Crepaz
and Damron 2009). The existing literature thus demonstrates that immigration
and ethnic heterogeneity often become an obstacle for the development of robust
welfare systems (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Bay and
Pedersen 2006). 
Empirical research in the European context has been limited to Northern
European countries and has focused mainly on addressing migrants’ total partici-
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pation in the system and the assessment of the overall economic burden immi-
gration poses on specific welfare programs (Pedersen 2000). Bay and Pedersen,
for example, examined the relationship between views on unconditional income
redistribution policies and ethnic heterogeneity in Norway. They found that many
initial supporters of an unconditional basic income policy changed positions
when told it would include non-citizens living in Norway (2006, 432). Along these
lines, Koopmans (2010, 8) argues that immigrants’ incentives for developing lan-
guage proficiency and improving human capital are lower in these societies and as
such they are characterized by a culture of dependency. From this perspective, robust
welfare state systems supposedly become a magnet (pull factor) as immigrants
tend to gravitate to countries with relatively good protection systems (Borjas 2002).
Over time, concerns also arise that continued immigration flows will endanger the
very financial existence of the welfare state system (Borjas 2002). Overall, this eco -
 nomic argument can be summarized as follows: countries with higher social inequa lity
are more attractive to skilled immigrants, whereas countries with generous welfare
states are more attractive to unskilled immigrants resulting in what Koopmans would
characterize as a “negative selection” process (2010). 
With the exception of a few studies (Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Crepaz and
Damron 2009; Facchini and Mayda 2007; Koopmans 2010), cross-national empi r -
ical research examining perceptions of welfare state systems and immigration is
scarce. Some work has focused on examining differences between the perceptions
of the poor in European countries and the United States (Alesina and Glaeser
2004). In a study examining the relationship between welfare determinants and
individual attitudes in Europe, Facchini and Mayda (2007) show that attitudes
among high income individuals toward unskilled immigrants are more negatively
affected by unskilled immigration only if taxes are raised to maintain per capita
accessibility to benefits. In contrast, individuals at the bottom of the income distri -
bution suffer more with unskilled immigration if taxes are kept constant and the
adjustment is carried out through a reduction in per capita transfers. Based on this
evidence, I ex pect differences between perceptions of immigration (unskilled
and/or skilled) among individuals at the lower versus higher brackets of the income
distribution.
In a recent comparative study, Crepaz and Damron further confirm that
extensive welfare states vis-à-vis residual welfare states are in a better position to
absorb immigrants and reduce overall levels of welfare chauvinism (2009, 456).
Implicit in these findings is the assumption that an understanding of individuals’
opinions about welfare warrants an understanding of their perceptions of those
more likely to become welfare recipients. Building upon this past work, I argue that
bridging the gap in the social science scholarship focused on immigration and wel -
fare states requires a comparative framework to study cross-country differences in
the institutional determinants that explain individual attitudes about immigration
and immigration policies. Before setting out several hypotheses, a cha racteri za tion of
the different types of welfare state regimes is in order.
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TYPES OF WELFARE STATE REGIMES
Across Europe, different institutional and organizational structures reflect the array
of social policy models regarding migrants’ social rights (Cornelius et al. 2004; Soysal
1994; Esping-Andersen 1990; Sainsbury 2006). Within the social sciences, numer-
ous scholars have proposed different typologies of welfare state regimes (see Arts
and Gelissen [2002] for an extensive literature review on this topic). Although not
addressing how different regimes deal with immigration per se and notwithstanding
some negative criticism, Esping-Andersen’s 1990 seminal work has provided a useful
typology, identifying three types of welfare state regimes: liberal, con servative-cor po -
ratist, and social democratic. Castles and Mitchell identified four types: liberal, con -
servative, non-right hegemony, and radical (1993). Other scholars have further clus-
tered countries by different types based on entitlements (Arts and Gelissen 2002). 
With regard to immigration and welfare state regimes, Sainsbury (2006) esta b -
lishes a three-pronged classification: 1) the liberal inclusive model (e.g., the United
States) characterized by bestowing citizenship on the basis of birthplace criteria
(ius solis); 2) the conservative model based on exclusionary rights (e.g., Germany)
derived from lineage (ius sanguinis); and 3) a social democratic inclusive model,
based on residence rights (ius domicile). Another classification of welfare state
regimes is specifically tied to international migration. Soysal (1994) provides a clas -
sification of European countries based on incorporation regimes. She distinguishes
between corporatist, liberal, and statist. Examples of these models are Sweden
and the Netherlands for the centralized collectivist corporatist model, Britain and
Switzerland for the individualist liberal-decentralized model, France for the state-
centered incorporation regimen, and Germany representing a model between the
statist and corporatist. A central tenet in Soysal’s classification is the variation across
countries in terms of migrants’ capacity to formally create advocacy groups that
seek formal political representation in the host society. Swedish civil society, for
example, directly supports numerous ethnic migrant organizations coupled with a
comprehensive funding scheme aimed at strengthening “migrant’s self-organization
and increasing contact and cooperation between migrants and Swedish institu-
tions” (1994, 91). While a similar institutional environment is found in the Nether -
 lands, a more limited funding scheme is provided in Britain and Switzerland. In
contrast, France does not directly support collective ethnic identity and organizing,
while in Germany, funding for organizations is available, but is channeled through
the local government (as opposed to the national centralized scheme in Sweden
and the Netherlands). Also worth noting is the fact that funds oriented to the
preservation of a migrant’s original culture, political activities, and representation, as
well as political adaptation (such as services to migrants), are more abundant in
social democratic regimes compared to the other models.
Soysal also notes that the corporatist model is characterized by the function
of corporate groups, such as faith-based organizations and occupational associa-
tions, which play key roles in incorporating new immigrants. Under this model,
immigrants obtain their social rights through these corporate groups. Hence, it is
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centrally organized and collectively oriented (1994). The liberal model does not
have a centralized administration or formal collective groups that play a role in
incorporation. Rather, the labor market is the main instrument of incorporation.
Even though a central authority determines the basic rules and process of incor-
poration, that authority does not play a significant role; instead, individual action
is the main source of incorporation, with help from private associations or local
groups. The statist model is opposed to the liberal model, as the state is seen as the
administrative unit that organizes incorporation, and the model does not have an
intermediary structure (and so, it is distanced from the corporatist model). As these
classifications are helpful for examining the relationship between immigration and
institutions, some scholars have questioned their theoretical and construct appli-
cability (Freeman 2006). In the analysis proposed here, I use public so cial benefit
expenditures as a percentage of GDP as an approximation of program matic prefer-
ences of different welfare states and move away from case-specific analysis in
attempting to validate these typologies. Before I undertake the empirical analysis,
I discuss the main theoretical influences informing the hypotheses.
From Threat to Perceptions of the Welfare State
One key proposition informing this study is that perceptions of the welfare state
are tied to dynamics of ethnic competition and conflict (Freeman 2009). I con-
ceptualize perceived immigrant threat as the belief that immigrants negatively
affect the well-being of the dominant group and this belief has an impact on indi-
viduals’ attitudes toward redistribution and the welfare state. The threat dimension
is also conceptualized as being strongly correlated to anti-foreign exclusionism and
discriminatory policy attitudes (Escandell and Ceobanu 2009; Pettigrew 2000).
Thus, perceived threat as well as cultural and symbolic threats shape host socie-
ty members’ attitudes toward immigrants’ modes of incorporation and their access
to benefits (Fetzer 2000a, 2000b; Quillian 1995). Multi-ethnic societies are thus
more likely to exhibit a lack of altruism toward others, especially if the welfare
beneficiaries are perceived as physically and socially different and are ultimately
seen as threatening collective well-being. 
A second theoretical influence comes from studies examining how more or less
expansive and universal welfare state regimes influence the relationship between per -
ceptions of threat and perceptions of the welfare state system (Crepaz 2008). The
scholars argue that protectionism, chauvinism, and pessimistic views of the fu ture of
the welfare state develop as a result of strong in-group identification. The lack of trust
and inter-group solidarity toward other groups (perceived as being less worthy and “un -
deserving” of state benefits) may also influence exclusionary attitudes toward re dis -
tribution (see also Van Oorschot 2008). Crepaz and Damron, for example, frame this
process in terms of prejudice and reliance on social categorizations that starkly
differentiates “us” from “them” (2009, 445). These social categorizations foster psy-
chological processes such that “real” threat, conflict, eco nomic competition, or even
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prior contact/experience with that particular group is not necessary to spark prej-
udice (Sears et al. 2000). Thus, limited welfare state regimes characterized by
means-tested policies, unintentionally single out “the needy,” ultimately creating
stigmatization that can lead to exclusionism. In contrast, more universal expansive and
inclusive welfare states foster solidarity across different racial, social, and class
groups who participate and benefit from the same state benefits. While social cat-
egorization stresses the important role that threats play in creating feelings of protec -
tionism and chauvinism with regard to social po licies, the benefits of universal wel-
fare states is framed as fostering trust and solidarity across groups. 
A third theoretical influence emanates from the public opinion literature on
immigration that puts the embedded nature of micro-level predictors in larger con -
textual frameworks center stage. Contextual factors may include the effects of ethnic
composition (e.g., minority group size) and economic infrastructure (e.g., eco-
nomic inequality), as well as their roles in shaping the relationships between clas-
sic individual predictors and anti-immigrant sentiment (Ceobanu and Escan dell
2008; Escandell and Ceobanu 2009; Quillian 1995; Kunovich 2002; Semyonov, Re -
bec ca, and Gorodzeisky 2006). In such scholarship, the inclusion of macro-structu ral
factors makes possible new ways of explaining variations in attitudes. Researchers
were able to test an array of propositions about the embedded nature of public re -
s ponses toward immigrants and immigration policies while controlling for individual-
level attributes. Studies have shown, for example, that liberal-democratic traditions
constitute a key contextual predictor for the emergence of new forms of anti-im mi -
 grant sentiment (Ceobanu and Escandell 2008; Coenders and Scheepers 2003;
Hello, Scheepers, and Gijsberts 2002), permissiveness of immi gration policies (Hjerm
2007), or the degree of religious heterogeneity (Hello, Scheepers, and Gijsberts
2002). I add to this contextual approach the ways micro-level predictors are embed -
ded within perceptions of welfare state regimes.
With the above theoretical trajectories in mind, I argue that more empirical
attention has to be given to group threat perceptions and their effect on percep-
tions of welfare systems (as mechanisms of redistribution). This is especially rel-
evant since contextual measures, such as ethnic diversity, may be playing a key role in
the development of these views. Building upon this, two very distinct propositions
can be formulated: 1) group threat is a powerful mechanism to explain individuals’
views about the future of the welfare state, and, 2) contextual measures such as
ethnic diversity, economic conditions, and size of the welfare state are mediating
factors explaining the relationship between group threat and perceptions of the
welfare state. Thus, I hypothesize the following:
H1: Immigrant group threat explains increased pessimistic views about the
future, extent of coverage, and sustainability of the welfare system.
H2: Pessimism about the future of the welfare state is lower in countries with
less ethnic heterogeneity.
H3: Pessimism about the future of the welfare state is lower in countries with
more robust welfare state systems.
Data and Measurements
Data for this study come from the 2009 Eurobarometer 71.3 (European Com mis -
sion 2009). The pooled dataset is comprised of 30 333 individuals. For the analy-
sis, I use 24 European Union member states: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece,
Spain, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Austria, Por -
tugal, Sweden, Great Britain, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Li th -
uania, Malta, Poland, Slo vakia, and Cyprus. 
The analysis uses one dependent variable, tapping an index of perceptions of
welfare (0-1), combining five questions: “At the moment, when you think of the
future of your pension, would you say that you are…? Very confident, somewhat
confident, not very confident, and not at all confident”; “For each of the follow-
ing, please tell me whether you think it applies to the social welfare system of your
country: a) provides enough coverage; b) could serve as a model for other countries.”
These same questions were asked about the future: “Let’s think now about what
the [insert NATIONALITY] social welfare system will be in 2030” (see Table 1). Results
yielded a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.67 for the dependent variable.
Two key independent variables are operationalized to measure perceptions of
group threat: 1) a dichotomous measure based on respondents’ agreement with
the statement, “We need immigrants to work in certain sectors of the economy,”
where 1 refers to disagreement and 0 agreement (see Table 1). The key indepen -
dent variable measuring group perceptions is operationalized as a dichotomous
variable based on each respondent’s opinion of the statement, “The presence of
people from other ethnic groups increases unemployment in [our country].”  For this
second measure, to ensure that both variables are coded in the same direction,
1 refers to agreement and 0 refers to disagreement. Moreover, the former measure
captures the individual’s attitudes toward immigrants in Europe, and the latter
taps an overall measure of prejudice toward ethnic groups. The analysis uses three
additional individual-level variables regarding labor force status (“employed,” “un -
employed” (reference category), “students,” “retired” and “never in the labor force”).
Control variables were used, such as “political stance” (1-7 scale), whether the re -
s pondent lives in a rural area, and several socio-demographic variables such as “age”
and “sex”; respondent age upon completion of education was also transformed as
a dummy measure where 1 was “college educated,” and 0, “no college education.”  
Aside from the individual-level variables, the analysis uses a series of macro-
level measures to assess countries’ institutional environment, based on the official
national statistics offered by the Eurostat. The direct measure for the welfare state
regime is the total “social protection benefits” expenditure (as a percentage of the
GDP). This measure includes health care, pensions, unemployment, and other social
transfers. Regardless of whether migrants have access to these benefits or not, which
varies across countries, the goal is to assess the overall size of the welfare state re -
gimes in European Union countries. Two additional macro-level measures are
included in the analysis: the first seeks to tap ethnic heterogeneity and immigrant
composition of EU countries by using a proxy, the percentage of citizens from
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TABLE 1 
QUESTION WORDING AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
FOR THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL VARIABLES
Variable Description Mean S.D.
Welfare state Mean index of the following four items:a .57 .23
confidence For the following please tell me whether 
you think it applies to the (NATIONALITY):
Provides enough coverage
Could serve as a model for other countries
Let’s now think about what the 
(NATIONALITY) social welfare system 
will be in 2030. In your opinion:
Provides enough coverage
Could serve as a model for other countries
At the moment, when you think of 
the future of your pension, would you say   
that you are…? 
(1) Very confident, somewhat confident, not  
very confident, (0) not at all confident
Perceived group We need immigrants to work in certain 
size sectors of  the economya .48 —
The presence of people from ethnic groups 
increases unemployment in 
(OUR COUNTRY) a .58 —
Political stance In political matters, people talk of 
“the left” and “the right.” How would you 
place your views scale on this scale (1-7)? 5.43 2.29
Unemployed Labor force status: unemployedb .09
Students Labor force status: studentsb .08
Retired Labor force status: retiredb .28
Never in work force Labor force status: never in labor forceb .07
Employed Labor force status: employedb .47
Rural Would you say you live in a rural area? .37
Education How old were you when you stopped .27
full-time education?b   (=1)
Gender Respondent’s sex is maleb .45 —
Age Respondent’s age (years) 47.42 18.22
Marital status Could you give me the letter 
which corresponds .54
best to your own current situation?
NOTES: a Measured as follows: Agreement to disagreement. b Dichotomous variable (yes or no).
SOURCE: Eurobarometer 2009.
non-EU countries; the second is the aggregate-level control to capture disparities
among countries and reflect economic circumstances measured through the per
capital gross domestic product (“economic condition”).
MODEL
Using hierarchical modeling, the analysis estimates several models of perceptions
about the future of the welfare state as being determined by micro- and macro-
level variables. Table 2 reports the results of these models for the dependent variable
used. In Table 2, Model 1 and 5, I test for the random intercept effects without
any predictors at the macro level. This can be written mathematically as 
(1)
where Yij is the response of an individual i (i = 1, 2,…, nj) in the jth (j = 1, 2,…, J)
country on the dependent variable perceptions of the welfare state; Xqij (q = 1,
2,…, 13) is a level-1 predicting variable q for case i in unit j; betas are level-1 coef-
ficients (b0j the intercept andbqj is a vector of slopes); and rij is a level-1 residual. 
In Table 2, Models 4 and 5 include several parameters at the macro level, and
enable a testing of hypothesis 2 and 3. Mathematically, the model can be written
as follows:
(2)
whereb0j is the intercept estimated in equation (1); W0sj (s = 1, 2,…, 5) is a level-
2 predicting variable or interaction term;g00 is a level-2 intercept;g0s is the vector of
slopes for the estimated level-2 predicting variables; and u0j is a level-2 random
effect. Table 3 introduces hypothesis 3 and tests for the cross-level interactions,
expressed mathematically as
(3)
whereb1j is a vector of slopes estimated in equation (1) corresponding to the
three level-1 variables measuring perceptions of the welfare state; W1mj is a level-2
predicting variable (the direct and indirect measure for the institutional environ-
ment and other macro level controls);g10 is a level-2 intercept;g1m is a vector of
Yij = !0 j + !qj
q=1
13
! *Xqij + rij ,
!0 j = " 00 + " 0s
s=1
3
! *W0sj + u0 j ,
!1 j = " 10 + " 1m
m=1
3
! *W1mj + u1 j ,
342 XAVIER ESCANDELL
343
TA
B
L
E
2 
H
L
M
ST
A
T
IS
T
IC
S
F
R
O
M
T
H
E
M
O
D
E
L
S
P
R
E
D
IC
T
IN
G
T
H
E
E
F
F
E
C
T
S
O
F
C
O
N
F
ID
E
N
C
E
T
O
W
A
R
D
T
H
E
W
E
L
FA
R
E
ST
A
T
E
IN
24
 E
U
R
O
P
E
A
N
U
N
IO
N
C
O
U
N
T
R
IE
S
M
od
el
 1
M
od
el
 2
M
od
el
 3
M
od
el
 4
M
od
el
 5
M
od
el
 6
F
ix
ed
 E
ff
ec
ts
C
on
st
an
t
0.
34
4*
**
(0
.0
22
)
0.
35
6*
**
(0
.0
27
)
0.
36
8*
**
(0
.0
27
)
0.
36
8*
**
(0
.0
27
)
0.
36
8*
**
(0
.0
27
)
0.
36
6*
**
(0
.0
26
)
In
di
vi
du
al
 le
ve
l
G
ro
up
 th
re
at
 p
er
ce
pt
io
ns
:
N
ee
d 
fo
r t
he
 e
co
no
m
y 
(y
es
=1
)
0.
04
4*
**
(0
.0
04
)
0.
04
4*
**
(0
.0
04
)
0.
04
4*
**
(0
.0
04
)
0.
04
3*
**
(0
.0
07
)
C
au
se
 u
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t (
ye
s=
1)
-0
.0
44
**
*(
0.
00
6)
-0
.0
44
**
*(
0.
00
6)
-0
.0
44
**
*(
0.
00
6)
-0
.0
43
**
*(
0.
00
8)
R
ur
al
0.
00
7(
0.
00
5)
0.
00
7(
0.
00
5)
-0
.0
09
(0
.0
05
)
-0
.0
10
(0
.0
05
)
-0
.0
10
(0
.0
05
)
0.
00
9(
0.
00
6)
A
ge
0.
01
0*
**
(.0
00
3)
0.
00
9*
**
(.0
00
3)
0.
00
9*
**
(.0
00
3)
0.
00
1*
**
(.0
00
3)
0.
00
1*
**
(.0
00
3)
0.
00
1*
*(
0.
00
0)
M
al
e
(y
es
 =
 1
)
0.
03
0*
**
(0
.0
07
)
0.
02
3*
**
(0
.0
07
)
0.
02
3*
**
(0
.0
07
)
0.
02
3*
**
(0
.0
07
)
0.
02
3*
**
(0
.0
07
)
0.
02
4*
*0
.0
08
)
E
du
ca
tio
n
(=
1)
0.
01
3*
*(
0.
00
3)
0.
01
2*
*(
0.
00
3)
0.
00
8*
*(
0.
00
3)
0.
00
8*
*(
0.
00
3)
0.
00
7*
*(
0.
00
3)
0.
00
8*
(0
.0
03
)
M
ar
rie
d 
(y
es
=1
)
0.
00
7(
0.
00
5)
0.
00
8(
0.
00
5)
0.
00
7(
0.
00
5)
0.
01
0(
0.
00
5)
0.
00
7(
0.
00
5)
0.
00
7(
0.
00
5)
La
bo
r f
or
ce
 s
ta
tu
s:
U
ne
m
pl
oy
ed
a
(r
ef
.)
–
–
–
–
–
–
E
m
pl
oy
ed
(y
es
 =
 1
)
0.
04
4*
**
(0
.0
11
)
0.
04
3*
**
(0
.0
11
)
0.
03
8*
**
(0
.0
11
)
0.
03
8*
**
(0
.0
11
)
0.
03
8*
**
(0
.0
11
)
0.
03
8*
*(
0.
01
1)
St
ud
en
ts
(y
es
 =
 1
)
0.
 0
89
**
*(
0.
01
3)
0.
08
8*
**
(0
.0
13
)
0.
08
5*
**
(0
.0
13
)
0.
08
5*
**
(0
.0
13
)
0.
12
2*
**
(0
.0
13
)
0.
08
6*
**
(0
.0
14
)
R
et
ire
d
(y
es
 =
 1
)
0.
04
1*
**
(0
.0
13
)
0.
04
0*
**
(0
.0
13
)
0.
03
7*
**
(0
.0
13
)
0.
03
6*
**
(0
.0
13
)
0.
03
6*
**
(0
.0
13
)
0.
03
6*
*(
0.
01
3)
N
ev
er
 in
 la
bo
r f
or
ce
 (y
es
 =
 1
)
0.
02
4(
0.
01
8)
0.
02
2(
0.
01
8)
0.
02
2(
0.
01
8)
0.
08
4(
0.
01
8)
0.
02
4*
**
(0
.0
18
)
0.
02
4(
0.
01
8)
Po
lit
ic
al
 s
ta
nc
e 
(1
-7
)
-0
.0
02
(0
.0
02
)
0.
00
1(
0.
00
2)
-0
.0
01
(0
.0
02
)
-0
.0
01
(0
.0
02
)
-0
.0
01
(0
.0
01
)
C
on
te
xt
ua
l M
ea
su
re
s
E
co
no
m
ic
 C
on
di
tio
ns
 (A
)
–
0.
00
3*
**
(0
.0
00
)
0.
00
3*
*(
0.
00
0)
0.
00
3*
**
(0
.0
00
)
Im
m
ig
ra
nt
 g
ro
up
 s
iz
e 
(B
)
-0
.0
05
*(
0.
00
2)
-0
.0
03
*(
0.
00
2)
-0
.0
04
(0
.0
03
)
So
ci
al
 P
ro
te
ct
io
n 
Be
ne
fit
s 
(C
)
0.
00
3(
0.
00
2)
0.
00
3(
0.
00
3)
C
*u
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
-0
.0
03
**
*(
0.
00
2)
R
an
do
m
 e
ff
ec
ts
a
M
ac
ro
-le
ve
l, 
u 0
j
0.
00
9
0.
01
3
0.
01
4
0.
01
4
0.
14
In
di
vi
du
al
-le
ve
l, 
r ij
0.
04
0
0.
04
1
0.
04
1
0.
04
1
0.
04
1
N
O
T
E
: F
ix
ed
-e
ff
ec
t 
en
tr
ie
s 
ar
e 
un
w
ei
gh
te
d 
M
L
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
s 
(r
ob
us
t 
st
an
da
rd
 e
rr
or
s 
in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
).
 A
ll 
m
ac
ro
-le
ve
l v
ar
ia
bl
es
 a
re
 g
ra
nd
-m
ea
n 
ce
nt
er
ed
. a
 T
he
 r
an
-
do
m
 e
ff
ec
ts
 f
or
 t
he
 in
te
rc
ep
t-
on
ly
 (
un
re
st
ri
ct
ed
) 
m
od
el
 a
re
u 0
j
=
 0
.0
29
1 
an
d
r ij
=
 0
.0
58
1;
 *
p
″
 0
.0
5;
 *
* 
p
″
 0
.0
1;
 *
**
 p
″
 0
.0
01
. 
SO
U
R
C
E
:E
ur
op
ea
n 
C
om
m
is
si
on
 (
20
09
).
344 XAVIER ESCANDELL
level-2 slopes; and u1j is a level-2 random effect. The overall equation for all the
cross-level interactions can be expressed as follows:
(4)
wherebqj (q = 2,…, 10) is a vector of slopes estimated in equation (1) correspon -
ding to the level-1 control variables; W1j is the level-2 predicting variable;gq0 is a
vector of level-2 intercepts;gq1 is a vector of level-2 slopes; and uqj is a level-2 ran-
dom effect.
Results
Prior to estimating the multilevel models, bivariate analyses in Charts 1 to 3 assess the
association between the mean attitudinal confidence level about the future of
the welfare state and the three key macro-level measures in the 24 EU countries
analyzed. Some clear patterns emerge in these charts. For example, Chart 1 repre -
sents the bivariate relationship between per capita GDP and the mean level of con-
fidence about sustainability and coverage and the future of the welfare state. 
!qj = " q0 + " q1
q=2
13
! *W1 j + uqj ,
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CONFIDENCE IN THE FUTURE OF THE WELFARE STATE BY GDP PER CAPITA
KEY: Belgium (BE), France (FR), Austria (AT), Italy (IT), Poland (PL), Czech Republic (CZ), Cyprus (CY),
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SOURCE: European Commission (2009).
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First, the dependent measure shows great variability when it comes to assessing
confidence in the future of the system. As expected, there is a positive association
be tween per capita GDP and confidence in the future of the system. Especially rel-
evant is the confirmation that Northern European countries such as Denmark,
Finland, the Netherlands, and Austria are clustered together with the highest mean
confidence levels about the system. Also relevant in Chart 1 is the fact that Eastern
European countries, for the most part, are clustered together at the bottom in terms
of confidence levels. Luxemburg stands alone as it has the highest per capita GDP, but
remains close to the median level of confidence toward the welfare state. Inte r -
estingly, France and Ireland show relatively low levels of confidence in the future
of the welfare system as compared to other countries with higher GDP levels.
A less clear pattern of association is presented in Chart 2, which displays the
relationship between the percentage of non-EU citizens and mean confidence
levels concerning the future of the welfare state. As the measure is just a proxy of
ethnic heterogeneity, it is hard to discern a specific trend; however, three Northern
European countries (Finland, Denmark, and the Netherlands) show a relatively
high level of ethnic homogeneity and high confidence levels regarding the future
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CHART 2 
CONFIDENCE IN THE FUTURE OF THE WELFARE STATE
BY PERCENTAGE OF CITIZENS FROM NON-EU COUNTRIES
KEY: Belgium (BE), France (FR), Austria (AT), Italy (IT), Poland (PL), Czech Republic (CZ), Cyprus (CY),
Portugal (PT), Denmark (DK), Latvia (LV), Germany (GE), Lithuania (LT), Estonia (EE), Luxembourg
(LU), Slovakia (SK), Ireland (IE), Hungary (HU), Finland (FI), Greece (GR), Sweden (SE), Spain (ES),
Netherlands (NL), United Kingdom (UK)
SOURCE: European Commission (2009).
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of the welfare state. Along opposite lines, the UK, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Spain,
and Greece show relatively higher levels of ethnic heterogeneity coupled with
more skepticism about the future of the welfare system. The Eastern Euro pean
countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, and Slovakia) contradict the for-
mal expectation, as these countries show the lowest levels of ethnic heterogeneity and
among the lowest in confidence in the future of the welfare system. Two outliers are
Estonia and Latvia, with high levels of non-EU-member citizens, par ticularly a large
Russian minority, residing there. Overall, ethnic heterogeneity seems to be associ-
ated with lower confidence levels about the future sustainability of the welfare state.
Chart 3 further illustrates the privileged position of northern European coun -
tries, as it displays the association between social protection benefit expenditures
as a percentage of GDP and overall levels of confidence in the welfare state system.
Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland, and Austria are clustered together
in the top left corner of the graph since they score high on both measures. There is
a positive linear association between these two measures. Overall, investments in so -
cial protection benefits seem to translate into higher mean levels of confidence in
the future of the welfare system. Such findings, however, need to be put to addi-
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tional tests to assess the direction of the causal relationship. To accomplish this
and determine whether these contextual measures are predictors of perceptions of
the welfare state, a series of hierarchical models are presented below. 
I tested hypotheses 1 to 3 for the effects of key independent variables at the
micro and macro level on mean confidence levels regarding the future of the wel-
fare state. Model 1 in Table 2 shows the random intercept model of key controls
—all the predictors at level 1 are allowed to vary at the intercept level. The effects
show that older, highly educated, married people as well as males are more confi dent
about the future of the welfare system than other social groups. Especially relevant is
the fact that compared to the unemployed, all the groups measuring different
objective economic positions in the labor market reported higher mean levels of
the dependent variable. In Model 2, I introduced a key control, political stance,
which interestingly did not yield statistically significant results. Thus, political con -
servatism does not seem to play a key role in predicting confidence levels regarding
the system.
In Model 3, I introduced the two key predictors of group threat. The results
are revealing, since both variables are statistically significant in predicting a change in
the dependent variable (p< .000). The first predictor has a positive effect, as those
who agree with the statement “we need migrants for certain sectors of our economy”
express higher confidence levels about the future of the system. The effect is neg-
ative (as expected) when respondents agree with the statement “the presence of
people from other ethnic groups increases unemployment.” This variable further
demonstrates the robust effects of the group threat measures. Higher perceptions
of immigrant threat seem to lower the confidence in the overall future of the sys-
tem. These findings confirm hypothesis 1. Model 3 shows that with all the micro-
level variables introduced in the model, the amount of explainable variance in the
dependent variable between countries is 13 percent.
In Models 4 and 5, I introduce the three contextual measures at the random
intercept level. In Model 4, results show that countries with higher GDP levels dis-
play statistically significant higher mean levels of confidence in the system and
reiterate the findings of the bivariate analysis in Chart 1. Similarly, the ethnic het-
erogeneity effect is also statistically significant in predicting lower mean confi-
dence levels regarding the future of the welfare state. These findings confirm
hypothesis 2, which supports the literature exploring the embedded nature of atti-
tudinal models. Model 5 adds the contextual institutional measure of expendi-
tures on social protection benefits (as a percentage of GDP) which did not yield
significant results in explaining the dependent variable (hypothesis 3). This effect,
however, is key for estimating the cross-level interaction effects approximated in
Model 6. This final model also assesses hypothesis 3 regarding whether group threat
perceptions are more or less salient in more or less robust welfare state regimes.
In Model 6, the random slope model displays the effects of group threat. These
effects are measured as interacting with the size of the welfare state (the contex-
tual measure of social protection benefits expenditure). The results show that
group threat (in terms of ethnic minorities affecting unemployment) is a stronger
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effect in reducing welfare state confidence levels in countries with robust welfare
state systems. The overall estimated levels of confidence seem to be higher for indi -
viduals who do not experience group threat (especially in countries with robust
welfare systems). In contrast, the effects of group threat in reducing confidence in the
welfare state are also stronger among people living in a country with a robust wel-
fare system. After introducing the macro-level variables, the overall amount of
explainable variance in the dependent variable between countries is 60 percent. 
Conclusion and Discussion
This article examines the hypothesis that confidence in the welfare system is
affected by individuals’ perceptions of the economic threat immigrants pose. The
results confirm that both measures used to assess perceptions of threat (immigrants
are needed in certain economic sectors and the perception that ethnic minorities
cause unemployment) are strong predictors of confidence levels in the future of the
welfare state. The data show that as societies become more multiethnic and plural,
individuals become more ambivalent about the future of the welfare state. Is wel-
fare chauvinism behind these perceptions? The conclusion of these findings seems to
corroborate that welfare chauvinism underllies these perceptions since pessimism
about the future of the system is greatly explained by the group threat factor. The
conclusion of these findings is important theoretically because it confirms that per -
ceptions of the welfare state and ethnic competition and conflict are interrelated.
From this analysis, I infer that protectionism is associated with pessimism about the
future in terms of coverage, pensions, and expenditures levels, while openness is
associated with optimism about these dimensions of the system. 
In addition to the group threat effect, the findings are theoretically relevant,
as they demonstrate the embedded nature of public opinion processes. Chart 4,
shows the effects of the cross-level interactions analysis reported in Model 6 in
Table 3. As societies become more ethnically diverse, the trend suggests more
skepticism about the future of the system. This not only confirms the group threat
hypothesis but also how the visibility of minorities triggers not necessarily “realis-
tic” perceptions of their impact on the host society. More alarmingly, the findings
suggest that as societies develop more robust welfare systems, perceptions of threat
seem to play a greater role in decreasing confidence in the system. This finding
partially confirms the conservative turn in Finland’s recent elections. Since the
results support the idea that predicted mean confidence levels toward the system
are higher in countries with robust welfare state systems, a reverse pattern occurs
among those who are more intolerant. In other words, intolerant individuals, or
those who perceive immigrants as posing a threat, are more likely to live in a country
with a robust welfare system.
The results further confirm an additional model (not reported in Table 2 due
to space constraints) that shows that the unemployed (compared to other occupa -
tional groups), and thus those who are more vulnerable, exhibit lower confidence
348 XAVIER ESCANDELL
THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL POLICY MODEL 349
levels about the future of the system in countries with robust welfare state systems.
These results seem to contradict Crepaz and Damron’s 2009 findings regarding
the leveling effects of expansive welfare systems. Rather, the results explained
here suggest that threat, one of the key predictors of the dependent variable, is more
salient in countries with robust welfare systems.   
Overall, these results go in the direction of previous research by Bay and
Pedersen (2006) in Norway based on inter-group solidarity. Ethnic competition
changes views about redistribution and confidence in the system. Moreover, the
results partially confirm that the unemployed are more vulnerable and express more
uncertainty in countries with a strong welfare state system, compared to employed
individuals in a country with low levels of social benefits expenditure. The results
thus seem to corroborate that in social democratic and corporatist countries, while the
predicted level of confidence in the welfare state is higher, among vulnerable pop-
ulations (e.g. the unemployed), the effects of individuals’ perceptions of threat are
more salient.
The existence of generous state and local resources and networks of support
for migrants may trigger negative feelings among the most economically vulnera-
ble in host societies. Investing in strong local and national services not only for
immigrant populations (such as universal programs to help settlement, language
classes, access to health care, etc.), but also for the native born through multicultur-
al campaigns produces the outcome of a more integrated polity. By reaching out
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to the multiple constituencies within the nation-state, the implementation of gov-
ernmental programs can lay the groundwork for greater social adaptation. From
the perspective of public opinion, the findings in this article corroborate that anti-
immigrant sentiment is lower in Western European countries compared to the
former Soviet bloc. Investing in strong social protection systems seems to be a good
way to reduce this gap.
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